A nalogy and similarity are central in cognitive processing. They are often viewed as quite separate: Analogy is a clever, sophisticated process used in creative discovery, whereas similarity is a brute perceptual process that we share with the entire animal kingdom. This view of similarity has important implications for the way we model human thinking, because similarity is demonstrably important across many areas of cognition. We store experiences in categories largely on the basis of their similarity to a category representation or to stored exemplars (Smith & Medin, 1981) . In transfer, new problems are solved using procedures taken from prior similar problems (Bassok, 1990; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Keane, 1988; Kolodner, 1993; Novick, 1988 Novick, , 1990 Ross, 1987 Ross, , 1989 Winston, 1980) , and inferences about people are influenced by their similarity to other known individuals (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Read, 1984) . Even the way we respond affectively to a situation may be based in part on our responses to previous similar situations (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) . Thus, an under«tanding of similarity processing may provide general _ isight into human thinking.
In our research, we have taken a very different route from the "stars above, mud below" view of analogy and similarity. We suggest that the process of carrying out a comparison is the same in both cases. The general idea is summarized by the slogan "similarity is like analogy" (Centner & Markman, 1995; Markman & Centner, 1993a; Medin, Goldstone, & Centner, 1993) . We summarize recent evidence suggesting that the process involved in both similarity and analogy comparisons is one of structural alignment and mapping between mental representations (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Centner, 1989; Centner, 1983 Centner, , 1989 Centner & Markman, 1993 Goldstone, 1994b; Goldstone & Medin, 1994; Goldstone, Medin, & Centner, 1991; Markman & Centner, 1993a , 1993b Medin et al., 1993) . We begin with creative analogy and then turn to similarity.
Analogy
Johannes Kepler was a great discoverer and a prolific analogizer. He was an early champion of Copernicus's (1543 Copernicus's ( /1992 proposal that the earth and other planets moved, rather than the sun. In 1596, in the course of trying to work out the laws of planetary motion, Kepler found himself asking a seemingly simple question: Why is it that the outermost planets move slower than the innermost planets? According to the best existing models, the planets' motion was caused by planetary spirits or souls that impelled the planets on their courses. As Kepler noted, one possibility was that the spirits that moved the outer planets just happened to be weaker than the spirits that moved the inner planets; but he proposed instead the radical idea that there is one spirit or power emanating from the sun that moves all the planets: that is, that the sun causes the motion of the planets. 1 Kepler had hit upon a major idea, an important precursor of gravity. But there was a seemingly fatal objection. For the sun to move the planets would require action at a distance, an abhorrent notion to any physical scientist (including Newton, when he developed the full theory of gravity some 80 years later).
Kepler's response to this self-posed challenge was to consider an analogy to light. In his Astronomia Nova (The New Astronomy; 1609/1992), Kepler developed this analogy between the motive power and light (see Centner et al., in press, for details): с
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Who. I ask. will sav trut light is something material? Nevertheless, ji earn» out its operations with respect to plate, suffers alieraiion. is reflected and refracted, and assumes quantities so as ю he dense or rare, and to be capable of being taken ач a stirlace wherever it tails upon something illuminable. Now just js ii is said in nptics. thai light does not exist in ι he intermediate чрлсе between the source and ι he illunnnahle. this is equal!) ;нл' и1 'the шише pi»v\er {,\\tr<>n<inuit \n\ti. р 3S3( II light can travel undctcetahlv on its way between the source and destination. vet illuminate its destination, then MI ton could the mom е force be undeiectable on its wav from sun to planet. \et affect the planet's motion once it arrives at the planet. But Kepler was not content with a mere proof of possibility. He pushed the analog) further Me used it to state whv the moti\c power diminishes with distance: Just as the light from a lamp shines brighter on near objects than on further ones, so it is with the sun's mum е power, and for the same reason: The motive power (like the light» is not lost as it disperses but is spread out over a greater area. Because nothing is lost as the emission spreads from the source. Kepler ι 1609/199^) argued. "The emission, then, in the same manner as light, is immaterial, unlike odours, which arc accompanied by a diminution of substance, and unlike heat from a hot furnace, or anything similar which fills the intervening space" (p. 381 ι. Mere, odors and heat are used as "near-misses" (Winston. 1980 ) -potential analogs thai differ \vith respeel to the key behavior and serve to sharpen the parallel between light and the motive power.
Kepler's analogical model faced further challenges. Me had to explain why. given this power emanating from the sun, the planets mo\ed closer and further on their orbits instead of maintaining a constant distance from the sun. To meet these challenges, he again turned to analogy. For example, he invoked a "boatman" analogy to explain the in-and-out motion of the planets. Me postulated that the sun rotated around its axis, creating a whirling circular river of motive power that pushed the planets around.
: Then, as a ferryman can steer his boat (the planet; back and forth orthogonally to the river's current, so the planets, could move in and out with only a constant sidewisc current of moti\c power. But although Kepler worked this analog) fur decades, he was never satishcd with it; it seemed to require a degree of sentience on the part of the planets to sense how ю steer. In another much explored analogy, he likened the sun and planet to two magnets that approach or repel each other depending on which poles are proximate.
Kepler's writings demonstrate the central features of analogy. First, analogy is a device for conveying that two situations or domains share relational structure despite arbitrary decrees of difference in the objects thai make up the domains (Centner, 1983) . The magnet analogy, tor example, will stand or fall according to whether the causal relations between two magnets arc the same as those between-the sun and planet, and not according to the resemblance between a magnet and the sun. Common relations arc essential to analogy; common objects arc not. This promoting of relations over objects makes analogy a useful cognitive device, for physical objects arc normally highly salient in human processing-easy to focus on, recogni/e. encode, retrieve, and so on.
But this is still not specific enough. There is, in general, an indefinite number of possible relations that an analog) could pick out (Goodman. 1972) , and most of these are ignored. For example, we ma\ find a spiderweb and a fishing net analogous because both trap their prey, both remain stationary while their prey enters, and so on. But it would not contribute to the analog) lo note that "Both are smaller than the Taj Mahal,' or "Both are smaller than the Kremlin." Mow do we select which common relations to pay attention to' The major goal of this article is to demonstrate that the process of comparison-both in analogy and in similarity-operates so as to favor interconnected svstems of relations and their arguments.
.As the above discussion shows, to capture the process of analog), we must make assumptions not only about the processes of comparison, but about the nature of tvpical conceptual cognitive representations and how representations and processes interact (Palmer. 1978) . In particular, we must have a representational system thai is sufficiently explicit about relational structure to express the causal dependencies that match across the domains. We need a representational scheme capable of expressing not only objects but also the relationships and bindings that hold between them, including higher order relations such as causal relations.' One clarification is in
• In Kepler's pre-New Ionian prnsics. the -un was required lo push [he planets around in their orbits, not morel) ic atiraei ihem.
' Formal]), the elements of our representations are objects (or ennfiiii. object descriptors (called attribute*}, fimctwns (which express dimensional information}, and relations between representational elements Attributes and relations are predicate-^ilh truth values. Functions differ troni predicates in that the) map irom a set of arguments Arthur B. Marlcrnan order here. To discuss alignment processes, we need to take representation seriously, but this should not be taken to imply a commitment to any particular representation as the best or only possible representation of a situation.
(Logically, such a position would be indefensible.) Rather, we assume that the comparison process operates over a person's current representations, however they are derived. Thus, to predict the outcome ol a comparison, we should know the person's current psychological construa! of the things being compared, including goals and contextual information as well as lone-term knowledge.
Structural Alignment View of Analogy and Similarity
The defining characteristic of analog) is that it involves an alignment of relational structure. There are three psychological constraints on this alignment. First, the alignment must be strui-H4rull\ consistent; In other words, it must observe parallel connectivity and one-to-one correspondence. Parallel connectivity requires that matching relations must ha\e matching arguments, and one-to-one correspondence limits any element in one representation to at most one matching element in the other representation (Falkenhaincr. Forbus. & Gcntncr. 19S6, I9S9; Gent nor. 1983 Gent nor. . 1989 Centner A: Clement. 1988 9/1992! analog), the planet corresponds to the boat and the sun's power to the river's current, because they plav similar roles in a common relational structure. This also shows a second characteristic of analogy, namely, relational focus: AS discussed above, analogies must involve common relations but need not involve common object descripimto laJuos other than truth value·.. Г-or i-\arnpk·. a t'uncuun like color (bull) = red md) bo used to represent the dimension nf color. The same assertion could be represented UMIIJ; color a\ mi aunbute. a* in rtd (hull), or using color as a relation, a·, in color (ball. red). W-'e as\ume ihai him a propem is represented will aflect the wa> it i·. p^xjeued lions (e.g., it docs not detract from the analogy that the planet does not look like a boat). The final characteristic of analogy is sysiematicity: Analogies tend to match connected systems of relations (Centner, 1983 (Centner, , 1989 . A matching set of relations interconnected by hieher order constraining relations makes a better analogical match than an equal number of matching relations that arc unconnected to each other. The systcmancity principle captures a taeit preference for coherence and causal predictive power in analogical processing. We are not much interested in analogies that capture a series of coir.widences. even if there are a great many of them.
Л particularly striking example of structural dominance in analogy is that of" cross-mapping. Α <. M-M.Stnnp/iini; is a comparison in which iv.o analogous scenarios contain similar or identical objects thai plav diiYer.i;; relational roles in the two scenarios (Centner л. Tuupin. 1986 ; see also Centner & Rattermann. 1991; Goldstone & Medin, 1994; Markman & Gcntncr. 1993b : Ross. 1987 . Л simple example of a cros>-mapping i> this simple proportional analogy:
The obvious possibility of matching the two identical 3> is dismissed because to do so would misalign the relational roles of the terms. Instead, the object correspondences arc 1 -3 and 3 -* 9. preserving the relational commonality (the identical ratio) across the pair.
Given an alignment of structure, further inference* can often be made from the anaJogy. The implicit preference for systematic)!) -tor aligning ot" connected s)sicms of knowledge -is crucial here. It is what permit' us to generate spontaneous inferences. When we have aligned a system η the base domain with a (typical!) less complete) system in the target domain, then further statements (i4tmliJtite inferences) connected to the bjsc system in the base can be projected into the target. These candidate inferences arc only guesses: Their factual correctness must he checked separately. This uncertaintv iappropriate: Any process capable of producing novel truî nferences is also capable of generating false inference' This kind of spontaneous analogical inference abounds in Kepler' 1 · writings. He followed hi> initial anaiogv establishing that the motive power ι like light) car. operate at a distance with a series of further projection* I that the motive power {like light] spreads uut througr. space, that н becomes diffused without dmum-rimi; ir total quantity etc.). He even asked whether it could undergo an eclipse the decided not and used this disanalog) to conclude that the motive power cannot be the san'v ihing as the sun's light).
Similarity Is Like Analogy
Kepler's analogical feats are nothing short of amazing Reflecting on^his powers makes it clear why the abilit) to form analogies has been taken as a sign ot intelligence. making the four-term analog) problem a staple oi aptitude tests. But consider the following more pro>aic example:
Lucas, a 25-monih-old child, plays with a new toy thai has six colored doors. Each door has its own key-a red key for a red door, a blue key for a blue door, and so on. Lucas opens each door with the key of ihe corresponding color Then he sees a sevcnih while key. He carefully inspects the toy from top to bottom. Then he turns to his parents and asks. "Where the white door?"
Child development is full of these moments, as in the example of Aaron's analogy from self lo other discussed in the article by Holyoak and Thagard (1997. this issue) or this example contributed by Lise Menn {personal communication, February 1995): Her two-year-old son watched fascinated as some pet ducklings ale. Then he held his arms to his sides and bent down and up like the ducklings. Finally he announced, pointing at the ducklines. "Have no hands!" He had figured out why they ate so differently from him. These kinds of comparisonbased discoveries are so commonplace that they arc hardly noticeable as anything special, and yet they contain the same essential characteristics of analogical processing that marks Kepler's use of analogy.
In a fundamental sense, similarity is like analog). in that both involve an alignment of relational structure (Centner A Markman. 1945) . The difference between them is that in analogy, only relational predicates are shared, whereas in literal similarity, both relational predicates and object attributes are shared. In Kepler's analog ν. there is no physical resemblance between a boat on a ri\er and a planet revolving around the sun. In Lucas's similarity comparison, each kev and door pair is similar lo every other, making it casv tor Lucas to align the pairs. Thi·. contrast between analogy and literal similarity is in fact a continuum, not a dichotomy. Yet it is ;m important continuum psychologically, because overall similarity comparisons arc far easier to notice and map than purciv analogical comparisons, especially for no\ ices like Lucas tCentner. Rauermunn. &. Forbus. 1993; Holyo.ik & Koh. I9S7: Keane. I9KS: Ross. 1989) .
Figure 1 places this distinction between analogy anil similarity within н similaritv space dctined bv the degree of attributional similarity and the degree of relational similarity. Analogy occurs when comparisons exhibit ;i high degree of relational similarity with verv little attribute similarity. As the amount of attribute similarity increases, the comparison shifts toward literal similaritv. Λ/ί'ίϊ·-ί//ί/ϊ(·ϋΓίΐΗΓί' matches share object descriptions but not relations. For example, comparing a planet with a round ball would constitute a mere-appearance match. Mere-appearance matches arc. in a sense, the opposite tif analogies. Such matches arc of course sharply limited in their predictive utility. Nonetheless, they arc important to consider, because they often occur among children and other novices and may interfere with their learning. The bottom left corner of the space is anomalous comparisons, which share no significant attribute or relational commonalties. Finally, Figure 1 shows that metaphors span the range from relational comparisons (e.g. "two lovers like twin compasses") to attribute comparisons (e.g., "a moon like a silver coin").
Figure 1 Similarity Space, Showing Different Kinds of Matches in Terms of the Degree of Relational Versus ObjectDescription Overlap

Process Model of Alignment and Mapping:
The Structure-Mapping Engine \Ye have argued that the comparison process involves a rather sophisticated process of structural alignment and mapping over rich complex representations. A skeptical reader might justifiably inquire at this point whether there is any plausible real-time mechanism that could compute such a structural alignment. This problem is not trivial, and some early models made the assumption that the toplevel conclusion or coal oi the analogy was known in advance to case the computational burden (Greiner. 198S; Holyoak. 1985; see Centner & Clement, 1988 . for a discussion). However, these solutions are limited, because people can process analogies without advance knowledge oi their meaning. When you read "Philosophy is language idling." you probably understand its meaning without a prior goal context (although a relevant prior context would of course facilitate comprehension). Thus, a process model of comparison should be able to operate without advance knowledge of the final interpretation.
The structure-mapping engine (SME; Falkcnhainer et a!. Forbus, Centner. & Law, 1995) uses a local-to-global alignment process to arrive at a structural alignment of two representations/ Figure 2 shows SME's three stages of mapping. In the first stage, SME begins blind and local by matching all identical predicates and subprcdicates in the two representations. This initial mapping is typically inconsistent, containing many-tounc matches. In the second phase, these local matches are coalesced into structural!) consistent connected clusters (called kerntils). Finally, in the third stage, these kernuN iire merged into one or а few maximal structural!) consis· leni interpretations (i.e., mappings displaying one-to-one correspondences and parallel connectivity). SME then produces a structural evaluation of the interprctationis). using a kind of cascade-like algorithm in which evidence is passed down from predicates to their arguments. Thimethod favors deep systems over shallow systems, even if they have equal numbers of matches (Forbus. &. Genmcr. 1ЧХ9) . Finally predicates connected ю the common structure in the base, but not initially present in the target, are proposed as ctinJitiaic inferences in the target. Thus, structural completion can lead to spontaneous unplanned inferences. SME has the psychologically appealing feature that it can derive more than one interpretation for an analogs. It normally produces two or three best interpretations of an analogy -that is, interpretations receiving the highest structural evaluations. For example, suppose we asked SME to interpret another of Kepler's analogical conjectures, namely, lhat the earth might impel the moon just as the sun does the earth:
1. CAUSE (TRAVEL (motive power, sun. eanh). REVOLVE AROUND (earth, sun») 2. CAUSE [TRAVEL (motive power, earth, moon). REVOLVE AROUND fmoon. earth )I.
Given this cross-mapped pair. SME would produce a relational interpretation in which the earth in Sentence 1 corresponds to the moon in Sentence 2, as well a> an object-based interpretation in which the earth corresponds lo the earth. Because of its preference for deeply connected relational structure, the relational interpretation would receive a higher structural evaluation and would win over the object interpretation.
A good explanatory analogy can often be extended, as in Kepler's analogical extensions. Computational models have tried to capture this propensity with the no::on of incremental mapping. For example. SME can e\;end an existing analogical mapping by adding further connected material from the base domain (either drawn from current context or from long-term memory iForbus. Ferguson, & Gcntner. 1994 ; see also Burstein. 198S; Kea.nc, Ledgeway. & Duff. 1994] ). These models operate or. ihe assumption (which we discuss later) that extendir.i a connected mapping is easier than creating a r.ew mapping.
Structure Mapping at Work
Commonalities and Differences
The experience of comparison i^ selective: Only certain commonalities are highlighted. \Vc have suggested :nat a central factor controlling what information i> cor.sidcred in a comparison is s\sictnaticit\: the presence οί higher order com.actions between lower order relav.jns (Clement & Centner. 1991 : Forbus & Centner. N39: Centner. 1983 ). For example, comparing the picture* in Figure 3A and 3B highlights the commonality that :\>lh show a child looking at a pet. In contrast, compering Figure 3A with 3C highlight·· the commonality that "roth show an animal being frightened b\ another ar.imal iMarkman &. Gentncr. m prc>si. In both cases, ihe irrormation highlighted b\ the comparison forms a connected relational system, and commonalitie* not connecter to the matching system ι such as the fact that there are dressers in both 3A and ?B) seem to recede in importance. This pattern has aUo been demonstrated using pas^ges (Clement & Gentner. 1991) . In this stud>. people -лho were given analogous stories judged that corresponding sentences were more important when the corresponding sentence pairs were pan of a matching relational s\-;cm than when they were not.
More surprisingly, structural alignment also ir.rlucnces what differences are psychologicalU salient For example, when comparing Figure ЗЛ and 3B. we notice lhat it is a snake that the bo\ is looking at in one picture and a fish in the other. Both the snake and the fish play the same role in the matching structure. Differences lhat are connected to the common system (like the fish-snake differencet we call ttltgnahle differences (Gentner & Markman. 1994; Markman & Gentner. 199?b. ] 
ug6).
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Figure 3 The Role of Commonalities and Differences ι Similarity
Ahgnablc differences can be contrasted with nonaiifimihle differences, which are aspects of one situation that have no correspondence at all in the other situation. I-or example, in the comparison of Figures ЗЛ and 31i . the dog in Figure 3A has no correspondence with anything in Figure 3B . and hence it is a nonalignable difference. Just as commonalities gain in importance when they are part of a matching system, so too do differences. Thai is, ahgnablc differences are more salient than nonalignable differences. Intuitively, this focus on alignable differences makes sense, for it leads to a focus on those differences that are relevant to the common causal or goal structure that spans the situations. However, if we follow this logic a few steps further, we arrive at the rather intriguing prediction that there should be more salient differences for high-similar than for low-similar pairs (because in general, high-similarity pairs will have larger common systems and more alignable differences). For example, if you imagine listing all possible differences for the pair hotel-motel and contrast that with listing all possible differences for the pair magazinekitten, you will probably find that it is much easier to list differences for the first, high-similarity pair. Experimental results bear out this observation. Participants who were asked to list differences between hotel and motel readily listed (alignable) differences: "Hotels arc in cities, motels are on the highway"; "you slay longer in hotels than in motels"; "hotels have many floors, motels only one or two"; and so on. When given a low-similarity pair like magazine-kitten, participants tended lo list nonalignuble differences, such as "\bu pet a kitten, you don't pel a magazine," or "kittens have fur and magazines don't." This finding of a greater number of alignable differences for high-similarity pairs has been obtained in empirical studies involving both word pairs (Markman & Centner, 1993b; Markman & Wisniewski, in press) and picture pairs (Markman & Gcntncr, 1У96 ). An informal observation is that participants often expressed confusion or irritation over the low-similarity pairs, perhaps reflecting their feeling thai it makes no sense to talk about differences in the absence of a meaningful alignment.
If the comparison process focuses on alignable differences rattier than on nonalignable differences, then alignable differences should be listed more fluently than nonalignable differences. This means that people should find it easier to list differences for pairs of similar items than for pairs of dissimilar items, because high-similarit> pairs have many commonalties and, hence, many alignable differences. Such a prediction runs against the commonsense view -and the most natural prediction of feature-intersection models -that it should be easier to list differences the more of them there arc to list -that is, the more dissimilar the two items are. In a study by Gcntncr and Markman (1994) , participants were given a page containing 40 word pairs, half similar and half dissimilar, and were given five minutes to list one difference for as many different pairs as they could. They were told that they would not have time to do all 40 pairs, and so they should do the easiest pairs first. The results provided strong evidence for the alienability predictions; Participants listed many more differences for similar pairs (A/ = 11.4) than for dissimilar pairs (Л-/ = 5.9). Furthermore, this difference was concentrated in the alignable differences. Over twice as many alignable differences were given for similar pairs (Л/ = 9.0) than for dissimilar pairs (Л/ = 3.9).
Because people focus on alignable differences rather than on nonalignable differences when making comparisons, alignable differences have a greater impact on people's perception of similarity than do nonalignable differences. Thus, all else being equal, alignable differences count more against similarity than nonalignable differences. One way to test this prediction is to pit comparisons involving a given alignable difference against comparisons involving the same contrast as a nonalignable
Figure 4
The Importance of Alignable and Nonalignable Differences in Similarity difference. For example, in the top figure of the triad in Figure 4 , the man shoots an arrow at a target. In the nonalignablc-differencc option, the man shoots an arrow .it a target, bul there is also a bird (a nonalignable difference) in the picture. In the alignable-difterencc option, the man shoots an arrow at a bird (an alignabie difference); ihe target has been moved ю the tree behind the man. When asked which option is most similar to the target, participants chose ihc nonaUcnabte-diffcrcnce oplion, suggesting thai the alignabie difference decreased the similarity of the pair more than did the nonalignable difference (Markman &. Centner, 1996) ."
In summary, the process of structural alignment leads to a focus on matching relational systems. This focus determines both which commonalities are salient and which differences are salient. This last ma\ seem paradoxical: Why should the common alignment determine which differences are important? Yet, if we reflect that most pairs of items in the world are dissimilar, this pattern seems functionally sensible. Intuitively, it is when a pair of items is similar that their differences arc likely to be important.
Analogical Inference
Analogies can lead to new inferences, as Kepler's (1609 Kepler's ( / 1992 example demonstrates, and the same is true of >imilarity comparisons. As in analogy, when there is a match between a base and target domain, facts about the base domain that are connected to the matching information may be proposed as candidate inferences (Falkcnhainercia!., 1986 (Falkcnhainercia!., , 1989 . For example, imagine sou have d friend with a sarcastic sense of humor that makes her difficult to get along with but a helpful temperament thai Ά ins her the loyally of her friends. If you met a new person and discovered that he had a sarcastic sense of humor, then based on his similarity to your other friend. \ou would probably be more willing to suppose tha: he ь difficult to get along with than to infer that he ha-г helpful temperament that win> him loyal friend-.. This point was demonstrated in a study by Clement and Gentncr (1991) . They asked people to read pair> or analogous stories. The base story had two key facts, each of which was connected to a causal antecedent. Neither of these key facts was stated in the target story. Howewr. the target story did have a fact thai corresponded to one of the causal antecedents from the base. When participants were gwen the analog) and asked ю make a new prediction about the target story, they predicted the key fact that was connected to the matching causal antecedent more than twice as often as they predicted the other key fact. Convergent findings have been obtained by Read (1984) , Spellman and Holyoak (in press), and Markman (1996) . Likewise, Lassaline (1996) showed that people's willingness to infer new facts in a category-induction task increased when these facts were connected to shared causal reiations. These results show how structural alignment and mapping allow people to predict new information from old.
Connectivity and Asymmetry
People often find comparisons much more similar in one direction than the other, as Tvcrsky (1977) noted in his seminal treatise on similarity. For example, we prefer "Л scanner is like a cop> machine" to "A copy machine is like a scanner." As Tversky pointed out, this directionality \s al odds with the pervasive intuition that similarity is a symmetric relation (after all, if A is similar to B, then shouldn't В be equally similar to A?). Structure mapping offers a natural explanation: We propose that asymmetries typicalh arise when one of the comparison items is mure systematic than the other (Bowdle & Centner. 1996 : Centner & Bowdle. 1994 ). According to structure-mapping theory, inferences are projected from the Ixise to the target. Thus, having the more systematic and ainerent item as the base maximizes the amount of information that can be mapped from base to target. Consistent \\ith ihis claim. Bundle and Centner found that when participants were given pairs of passages varying in their caudal coherence. (he> (a) consistently preferred compari^on-i in which the more coherent passage was the base and the less coherent passage was the target, (Ь) generated more inferences from the more coherent passage to the les·. coherent one, and (c) rated comparisons with more coherent bases as more in formative than the reverse comparisons.
Extended Mapping
One particularly interesting use of analogy is in extended mappings. They arise in creative thinking, as when KcpJer explored the implications of analogies between the motive power and light or magnetism. Extended analogies are used in instruction as well: for example, when electric current and voltage are described in terms of water Mow and pressure (Centner & Centner, 1983) . They also arise in ordinary language, with metaphoric systems like "Marriage is a journey" that can be extended (e.g., ''"'You have to slog through the rough spots but eventually the road will get smoother" [Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson. I9SO] . We have found, consistent with the structuremapping account, that it is easier to extend an existing domain mapping than to initiate a new one [Boronat & Centner. 1996; Centner & Boronat, 1992) ). People who read passages containing extended metaphors one sentence at a time were faster to read the final sentence when it was a consistent extension of the metaphor of the passage, as in Example A (below), than when it utilized a different metaphor, as in Example В (below). For example, one passage described a debate in terms of a race:
A. Dan saw the big debate as a race. ... He knew that he had to steer his course carefully in the competition. His strategy was to go cruising through the initial points and then make his move. ... He revved up as he made his last key points. His skill left his opponent far behind him at the finish line.
B. Dan saw [he bij; debate as a war. ... He knew that he had to use every weapon at his command in the competition. He mapped (tut his straitrgy to ensure that he established a dominant position. . . .He intensified the bombardment as he nude his last key points. His skill left his opponent far behind him at the finish line.
If extending an existing connected mapping is easier than creating a new mapping, then people should be faster to read the final sentence in Example A than in Example B. This is exactly what happened. This finding fits with the compulational notion of incremental mapping, in which mctaphoric passages can be understood by adding to an initial mapping (F : orbus el al.. 1994; Kcanc et a!.. 1994). interestingly, this result held only for novel metaphors und not for conventional metaphors, it is possible that conventional metaphors have their mctaphoric meanings stored lexically, making it unnecessary to carry out a domain mappinc (Bowdle &. Centner. 1996; Gentncr & Wolff. 19%) .
Connectivity and Pure Mapping
Learners are often called on to map information trom one situation to another. For example, when we buy a new VCR. climb into a rental car, or fire up an update of Windows, we must decide which aspects of our prior knowledge apply to the new situation. To study the determinants of this mapping process. Centner and Schumacher (1986; Schumacher & Centner, 1988 ) taught participants how to pilol a .ship using a simulated device panel. A game-like task was used in which participants could directly manipulate certain parameters {such as engine thrust or coolant valve opening) that controlled other parameters (such as velocity or engine temperature). If the')' performed corrcciiy. the ship made port in lime; otherwise, they lost ihc game. After the first device had been well learned, participants were transferred to a second analogous device panel, and the number of trials to reach criterion on the new panel was measured. Participants' speed of learning was affected both by transparency-participants learned the new panel faster when there were physical resemblances between structurally corresponding elements -and by systcmaticity -participants learned the new panel faster when they had learned a causal explanation for the procedures.
Consistent with these patterns, both Ross (1987 Ross ( . 1989 and Reed (1987) have found transparency effects. They have shown that participants are better at transferring algebraic solutions when corresponding base and target objects arc similar. Reed measured the transparency of the mapping between two analogous algebra problems by asking participants to identify pairs of corrcspending concepts. He found that transparency was a good predictor of their ability to notice and apply solutions from one problem to the other. Ross (1989) found thai participants' ability ίο transfer the problem-solving solution correctly was disrupted when cross-mapped correspondences were used. Research with children shows early effects of transparency and somewhat later effects of systemaiicity (Centner & Toupin, 1986) . We suspect that to derive the benefits of systematic explanations may require possessing some degree of domain knowledge.
Three generalizations emerge from ihc transfer studies. First, transparency makes analogical mapping easier. Close, literal similarity matches are the easiest sort of mapping and the kind for which participants are least likely to make errors. Second, possessing a systematic higher order structure can permit transfer even under adverse transparency conditions. Having a strong causal model can enable a learner to transfer even when the objects mismatch perceptually. A third point, on which we expand below, is that different kinds of similarity may enter into different subprocesses of transfer.
Further Implications
Ubiquity of Alignment
Our structure-mapping abilities constitute a rather remarkable talent. In creative thinking, analogies serve to highlight important commonalities, ю project inferences, and to suggest new ways to represent the domains. Yet. it would be wrong to think of analogy as esoteric, the property of geniuses. On the contrary, we often take analogs for granted, as in examples like the following from Hofstadtcr (1995, p. 76) . Tim does not mean that he too is going to pay for Shelley's beer I the nonanalogica) interpretation), nor even that he too is going to pay for his own beer, but rather that he is going to pay for what in his situation best corresponds to Shelley's beer: namely, his coke. This ability to carry out fluent, apparently effortless, structural alignment and mapping is a hallmark of human cognitive processing.
Plurality of Similarity
We have reviewed evidence that similarity is a process, of structural alignment and mapping over articulated representations. However, similarity docs not always appear so structurally discerning. Λ particularly striking case occurs in similarity-based retrieval. Several findings suggest that similarity-based retrieval from long-term memory is based on overall similarity, with surface similarity heavily weighted, rather than by the kind of structural alignment that best supports inference (Centner, 1989; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Keane, 1988; Ross, 1989; Seifen. McKoon, Abelson, & Ratcliff, 1986) . For example. Gentncr et al. (1993) gave participants a memory set of stones and later probed them with stories that were similar in various ways. The greater the surface similarity between the probe and a target in memory (in terms of shared objects and characters), the more likely the target was to be retrieved. In contrast, the greater the degree of shared higher order relational structure (such as shared causal structure), the higher the rated inferential soundness and similarity of the pair. Thus, the kind of similarity that most reliably led to remindings was not the kind participants most valued in making inferences. In fact, participants often rated their own remindings as low in both soundness and similarity.
Findings like this suggest that similarity is pluralistic (Centner. I989; Goldstone, I994a; Medinet al.. 1993) . Indeed, a parallel disassociation has been found in problem-solving transfer: Retrieval likelihood is sensitive to surface similarity, whereas likelihood of successful problem solving is sensitive to structural similarity (Keane. 3988; Ross, 1987 Ross, , 1989 ; but see Hammond, Seifen. & Gray. 1991) . This suggests that different kinds of similarity may have different psychological roles in transfer. The simulation "Many are called-but few are chosen" (MAC-FAC; Forbus et al., 1995) models this phenomenon with a two-stage system: The first stage (MACt is an indiscriminate, computationally cheap search for any kinds of similarities in memory, and the second stage (FAC) carries out a structure mapping of the candidates from the first stage.
Another way in which similarity is pluralistic is that different kinds of similarity emerge at different points in processing. Response deadline studies of relational comparisons suggest that when participants are required to respond quickJy (under 700 ms or under 1.000 ms, depending on the lask and materials), they base their sense of similarity on local matches (even cross-mapped object matches) rather than on relational matches (Goldstone &. Medin, 199-1; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1989) . Al longer response deadlines, this pattern is reversed. This time course of similarit) has been successfully modeled for processing features conjoined into objects b> Goldstone and Medin's (199-tj Similarity, Interactive Activation, and Mapping (SIAM) model, using a local-to-global ргосе<.> like thar of SME. Overall, the difference between early and late processing seems to be a shift from local matches to global structural alignment.
Implications for Other Cognitive Processes
Categorization. Structural alignment and mapping can provide insight into other cognitive processes isec Figure 5 ). As one example, similarity is often given a central role in categorization (Hampton. 1995 . Rosch. 1975 Smith & Medin, 1981) . It is common to assume vhat obiects can be categorized on the basis of perceptual, behavioral, or functional commonalities with the category representation (e.g.. robins are seen as bird* because of their perceptual and behavioral similarity to л promtype bird or to many other birds that have been encountered). However, many researchers have pointed cut cases in which rated similarity and probability of category membership are dissociated (Gelman & Wellman. 1991;  Kcil. 1989; Rips, 1989) . For example, bats have Ihe perceptual and behavioral characteristics of birds (they arc similar to birds in this sense), but they are classified as mammals, because of important (though nonobvious) properties, such as giving birth to live young. On the basis of examples like this, similarity's role in categorization has been challenged; it has been argued that category membership judgments are theory based rather than similarity based (Kcil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985) . The process of alignment and mapping points the way to a reconciliation of similarity-based and theorybased accounts (sec also Goldstone, 1994a ). If we focus purely on perceptual similarity among objects, we are led to conclude that bats should be categorized with birds. On this view, theory-based knowledge (such as why bats are mammals) must intervene from elsewhere lo overrule this assignment. However, if the similarity computation is assumed to be that of structural alignment, then the similarity between two instances will be based not only on object-level commonalities but also on common relations such as common causal relauons and common origins. Assuming that our representations include information about theory-based relations, such as that bats bear live young, as well as information about features, then the schism between similarity-based and theory-based categorization may be more apparent than real.
Developmentally, if we assume that theoretical knowledge is acquired gradually, this view would account for the characteristic-to-defming shift (Keil & Batterman, 1984 ) in children's interpretations of word meaning from local object features (e.g., a taxi is bright yellow and has a checkered sign) to deeper relational commonalities (e.g., a taxi is a vehicle that may be hired to transport people).
Choice and decision. Structural alignment also sheds light on the processes underlying choice behavior. Medin, Goldstone, and Markman (1995) reviewed parallels between phenomena in decision processing and phenomena in comparison processing that suggest an important role for structural alignment in decision making. Structural alignment influences which features to pay attention to in choice options. Research suggests that alignable differences are given more weight in choice situations than are nonalignable differences (Lindemann & Markman, 1996; Slovic & MacPhillamy, 1974) . For example, Markman and Medin (1995) asked participants to choose between video games and to justify their choices. Their justifications were more likely to contain alignable differences than nonalignable differences. As another example, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) described to participants a hypothetical store in which a jacket could be bought for SI25 and a calculator for SI5. They offered participants the opportunity to go to another store and save $5 on the total purchase. Participants who were offered a jacket for S125 and a calculator for S10 were more willing to make the effort to go to another store than those offered a jacket for S120 and a calculator for S15. Even though the monetary reward for going to the other store was the same for both groups, participants were influenced by the alignable difference.
Conclusions
Comparison processes foster insight. They highlight commonalities and relevant differences, they invite new inferences, and they promote new ways of construing situations. This creative potential is easiest to notice when the domains compared are very different, as in Kepler's analogies or John Donne's metaphors. But even prosaic similarity comparisons can lead to insights. Sometimes these insights are so obvious that we might fail to notice them, as when two-year-old Lucas noticed the repeated pattern of keys opening doors; or Aaron (in Holyoak & Thagard's article, 1997) spontaneously switched roles in the kiss-and-make-better schema; or when a six-year-old realized that tulips must need water, because people do (Inagaki & Hatano, 1987) . At first glance, these mundane examples might seem to have nothing in common with the bold analogies of scientific discovery. But let us close
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January 1997 · American Psychologist with our own analogy. Analogies are like comets, flashing through our awareness and riveting our attention. Literal similarity is like planetary motion: steady, predictable, and prosaic. But the planets are central to the behavior of the solar system, and (like literal similarity comparisons) they are always with us. Finally, both planets and comets are governed by the same fundamental iaws.
